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In this article I develop a proposal for the theoretical vantage point of the sociology of 
markets, focusing on the problem of the social order of markets. The initial premise is 
that markets are highly demanding arenas of social interaction, which can only operate 
if three inevitable coordination problems are resolved. I define these coordination prob-
lems as the value problem, the problem of competition and the cooperation problem. I 
show that these problems can only be resolved based on stable reciprocal expectations 
on the part of market actors, which have their basis in the socio-structural, institutional 
and cultural embedding of markets. The sociology of markets aims to investigate how 
market action is structured by these macrostructures and to examine the change of 
institutions, networks and cultural frames of market action.
Zusammenfassung
Dieses Discussion Paper stellt einen theoretischen Ansatz für die Marktsoziologie dar, 
in dessen Zentrum die Frage nach der sozialen Ordnung von Märkten steht. Ausgangs-
punkt der Argumentation ist, dass Märkte hochkomplexe Arenen sozialer Interaktionen 
sind, deren Funktionsweise nur dann gewährleistet ist, wenn drei unvermeidliche Ko-
ordinationsprobleme gelöst werden können: das Werteproblem, das Wettbewerbspro-
blem und das Kooperationsproblem. Die Argumentation zeigt, dass diese Probleme nur 
auf der Basis stabiler reziproker Erwartungen auf Seiten der Marktakteure lösbar sind, 
die in der soziostrukturellen, institutionellen und kulturellen Einbettung der Märkte 
wurzeln. Das Ziel der hier entworfenen Marktsoziologie ist herauszufinden, wie diese 
Makrostrukturen Handlungen von Marktakteuren prägen, und die Dynamik von Insti-
tutionen, Netzwerken und kulturellen Rahmungen des Markthandels zu analysieren.
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1 Introduction
Markets are the central institutions of capitalist economies. The development of mod-
ern capitalism can be viewed as a process of the expansion of markets as mechanisms 
for the production and allocation of goods and services. This applies not just to la-
bor markets, which only emerged on a significant scale with industrialization, but also 
to the organization of the production and distribution of consumer and investment 
goods, services and commodities. The increasing separation of the economy from the 
household and its organization through market exchange allowed for a scope in the 
development in the division of labor and production of wealth that would otherwise 
have been unattainable.
The dramatic expansion of markets does not mean that markets are the only instru-
ments that regulate economic processes in capitalist economies. Hierarchical structures 
as well as redistribution and reciprocity play an important role alongside the market 
mechanism (Polanyi 1957). Markets nevertheless stand at the core of the organiza-
tion of the capitalist economy. Although enterprises are not themselves organized as 
markets, the structures and decisions of companies are orientated towards anticipated 
market outcomes. Welfare state redistribution only comes in as a secondary allocation 
mechanism when actors cannot earn their income through the market. Reciprocal ex-
change relationships persist alongside markets, but wane in significance with the de-
cline of production in the household. 
No one seriously questions the central role of markets in capitalism. This makes it all 
the more surprising how little attention has been paid to the study of markets in mod-
ern economic theory, but also in the other social sciences that address economic subject 
matter. For a long time, modern economics focused only in a very limited way on mar-
kets. General equilibrium theory, as the heart of neoclassical economic theory, analyzed 
the formation of efficient distribution equilibria via the market. The interest here was 
not in studying the empirical functioning of markets and its institutional preconditions 
(Coase 1988: 7–8; Lie 1992: 508), but rather in the mathematical proof of efficiency pos-
tulates, conducted under a variety of simplifying assumptions. These include not just 
the assumption of the flexibility of prices, but also, in particular, assumptions concern-
ing the characteristics of goods as well as the actors’ rationality and information supply. 
Neoclassical economic theory thus has not so much a theory of the market as a “pure 
theory of exchange” (White 1990: 3).
In its founding phase, sociology was interested in the institutional preconditions for 
markets, as reflected especially in the work of Max Weber (1978) and Émile Durkheim 
(1947). By the post-war period, however, sociologists interested in economic structures 
This is the much changed version of a paper that has appeared before in German (Beckert 2007b). 
Parts of the text are based on a translation by Pamela Selwyn. The article is currently under review 
for publication in a journal. I would like to thank Patrik Aspers, Marie-Laure Djelic, Rudolf Rich-
ter, Marc Schneiberg and Richard Swedberg for their insightful comments.   
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were far more concerned with analysing the organization of industrial production pro-
cesses. Only labor markets received more intensive attention. The reason for this may be 
sought in the strong state influence in the organization of post-war economies, which 
curtailed the impact of the market mechanism (Djelic 2006: 59), but also in the influ-
ence of Talcott Parsons and his suggestion for the division of labor between economics 
and sociology (Beckert 2002: 135ff.). Later, the orientation towards Marxist approaches 
with their primary interest in exploitation in the sphere of production contributed to a 
de-emphasis on markets in sociological scholarship as well.
It was only developments in economics and sociology since the 1970s and the 1980s, 
respectively,  that put markets back in the spotlight of the social sciences as a field of 
empirical study (Lie 1997; Swedberg 2003: 115). In this article, I sketch the constitutive 
concern standing at the core of the sociology of markets and outline more concrete 
research problems that must be addressed in order to understand the operation of mar-
kets. I argue that the core issue of the sociology of markets is to explain the order of 
markets. By the order of markets I mean the simple fact that the coordination of eco-
nomic production and distribution through the mechanism of market exchange brings 
about a system of continuous high level of coordinated economic activity despite the 
heterogeneous motives and interests of the participating actors. What are the precondi-
tions under which markets lead to an orderly coordination of economic activities and 
not to economic and social chaos? 
My point of departure is that markets are highly presuppositional arenas of social in-
teraction, in which actors are confronted with profound coordination problems. While 
economic organization based on redistribution and reciprocity also entails coordina-
tion problems, these problems become much more taxing in market economies. This 
is because capitalist economies not only constantly create new markets but also destroy 
old ones, which leads to a continuous reentering of uncertainty both inside the economy 
and outside of it (Beckert 1996). It is from the analysis of the coordination problems and 
the conditions for their resolution that the functioning of markets can be understood. 
I argue that three such coordination problems can be analytically distinguished: I call 
them the value problem, the problem of competition and the cooperation problem. These 
coordination problems can only be resolved if market actors are able to form stable ex-
pectations with regard to the actions of other market actors and future events relevant 
for their decisions, and if the expected outcomes are considered normatively acceptable, 
i.e. legitimate. While the notion of the “order of markets” refers to the macrolevel result 
of the solution of the three identified coordination problems, the stable expectations 
formed by actors constitute the building blocks of this order on the actor level.
In line with other sociological approaches to markets, I pursue the argument that mar-
ket actors’ stable expectations are formed by the structural, institutional and cultural 
embeddedness of market exchange. This reveals market exchange to be a form of so-
cial interaction that cannot be explained by a “natural propensity to truck, barter and 
exchange” (Smith 1976: 17), but only by the institutional structures, social networks and 
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horizons of meaning within which market actors meet. I contribute to the sociological 
conceptualization of markets the distinction between the three coordination problems, 
each of which has been extensively discussed individually, but which haven’t been rec-
ognized as forming a comprehensive tableau of founding problems for the sociology of 
markets. If the order of markets depends on the resolution of the three identified coor-
dination problems and if this resolution depends on the formation of stable expecta-
tions on the side of market actors and the social legitimacy of market outcomes, which 
themselves depend on social macrostructures, the task of market sociology is to study 
both: the emergence and shaping of the social macrostructures relevant in the market 
context as well as the structuring of market action – and the distribution of exchange 
opportunities – by these macrostructures. 
In the first part of the article, I provide a brief outline of the analysis of markets in 
several economic approaches and in economic sociology with reference to the vantage 
point just sketched. In the second part, I introduce and discuss the three coordination 
problems based on a theoretical explanation of why these problems comprise the cen-
tral subject matter for the sociological analysis of markets. In the third part, I counter 
the impression that a sociological approach to markets centered on the order of mar-
kets would lead to a static perspective by developing a model of the dynamic changes 
of markets, arguing that the dynamics of markets emerges from a constant oscillation 
between the stabilization and destabilization of expectations. This is followed by a brief 
conclusion.
2 The social order of markets 
Markets are arenas of social interaction. They provide a social structure and institution-
al order for the voluntary exchange of rights in goods and services, which allow actors 
to evaluate, purchase and sell these rights (Aspers/Beckert 2008, forthcoming). Markets 
contain not only the element of exchange but are characterized by competition, which 
means that the existence of a market presupposes at least three actors: one on one side 
of the market confronting at least two other actors on the other side whose offers can 
be compared. “A market may be said to exist wherever there is competition, even if only 
unilateral, for opportunities of exchange among a plurality of potential parties” (We-
ber 1978, Vol. 1: 635). Actors on both sides of the market interface have partly similar 
and partly conflicting interests: while they must both be interested in the exchange of 
a good, they have conflicting interests regarding the price and other specifications of 
the contract from which a “price struggle” between them emerges that results – if the 
exchange is to take place – in a compromise between the exchange partners.
How is it that economic production and distribution can be successfully organized 
through markets? At first sight, this may seem a pointless question, since billions of 
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market transactions take place “silently” every day, and the coordination of the produc-
tion and distribution of commodities via the market thus appears to be quite unprob-
lematic. Only by adopting an outside perspective do we realize how presuppositional 
and thus improbable the coordination of economic processes via markets actually is. 
For all market actors the organization of economic activities through markets entails 
risks that seem to make it unlikely that they would entrust their economic well-being to 
this mechanism. The producer may not find a buyer for his product at a profitable price, 
either because potential purchasers do not need it or because a competitor captures his 
business. Buyers and sellers may not fulfill their contractual responsibilities, defrauding 
their exchange partners instead. The product may not possess the promised qualities. 
Buyers do not know whether they might not be able to purchase the product more 
cheaply or in a better quality elsewhere, or whether the purchase of another product 
will turn out to be more profitable. Workers do not know whether their labor power 
will meet a demand in the labor market. These examples show that market exchange is 
full of contingencies beyond the control of single actors, and thus of a high degree of 
uncertainty in regard to outcomes. The contingencies of market exchange make mar-
kets precarious arenas of social interaction, the “functioning” of which is anything but 
self-evident. Only when it is possible to integrate the individual behavior of market 
actors in such a way that they develop enough confidence to accept the risks of market 
exchange can the market operate as a regulatory mechanism for the fulfillment of adap-
tive functions in society. But how can we explain this integration of action and thus the 
order of markets?
The most influential answer to this question is provided by liberal economic theory and 
is based on the assumption that actors participate in market exchange out of self-inter-
est. According to this view, “social order” can be stabilized in markets because exchange 
offers advantages to the individual participants. The liberal train of thought is not lim-
ited to explaining individual participation in markets but entails a theory of social order 
as well. The coordination of economic activities through markets leads to an efficient 
allocation of economic resources where exchange takes place until no actor can increase 
his or her utility further without making at least one actor worse off (Pareto optimal-
ity). Assuming that exchange is always voluntary, liberal economic theory can explain 
a harmonious and wealth-maximizing social order based on actors pursuing their in-
dividual interests. This explanation of the stability and efficiency of markets, however, 
depends on far-reaching assumptions regarding the way actors make decisions and the 
information they have with which to make them. As long as one takes for granted that 
these assumptions are being met, one can explain the order of markets in terms of the 
self-interest of participating actors and restrict the study of markets to the creation of 
equilibria through price adjustment. “[O]rder is grounded in each agent acting ratio-
nally to maximize his or her own preferences within the constraints of a competitive 
economy” (Gould 1991: 92–93; cf. also Hirschman 1986: 123). To invert the argument, 
this means that the problem of order returns as soon as we depart from the idealized 
assumptions of neoclassical theory with its “single exit” solutions (Latsis 1972).
Beckert: The Social Order of Markets 9
Information economics and the new institutional economics
The unrealistic assumptions of the neoclassical market model have brought economists 
to distance themselves from some of these premises in their own modelling. Large parts 
of the development of economic theory since the 1970s have been attempts to under-
stand what would happen to the equilibrium model if one changed its assumptions: 
if one abandoned the premise of complete information and radicalized the economic 
model of action in a Hobbesian manner. This brought back the previously “solved” 
problem of the order of markets, however. 
The two most important lines of research here are information economics (Akerlof 
1970; Stigler 1961) and the new institutional economics (North 1990; Richter/Furubotn 
2003; Williamson 1975, 1985, 2000). Information economics abandons the assumption 
that actors are completely informed about the quality of a commodity. The paradig-
matic point of departure for this line of research is George Akerlof ’s essay “A Market for 
Lemons” (Akerlof 1970), in which he shows that assuming an asymmetrical distribu-
tion of information – the potential buyer of a used car knows less about the characteris-
tics of the automobile for sale than the seller – no market for used cars develops, that is, 
market failure ensues. The solution proposed by the economics of information involves 
the introduction of safeguarding institutions by vendors, such as guarantees on used 
automobiles or investment in the vendor’s reputation, which reduce the purchasers’ 
risks (of buying a “lemon”) and increase their willingness to purchase. The market is 
less efficient in this case than it would be if all parties were fully informed, but market 
failure can be avoided. 
The new institutional economics (North 1990; Richter/Furubotn 2003; Williamson 
1975, 1985, 2000) radicalizes the action assumptions of neoclassical theory by giving up 
the notion – present since the beginnings of modern economics – of an “honest mer-
chant” who acts based on his or her self-interest, while at the same time respecting the 
property rights of others (Hirschman 1987). This assumption is supplanted by a Hob-
besian model of action centered around the notions of “opportunism” and “self-interest 
seeking with guile” (Williamson 1975: 255). In this model of action, it is assumed that 
an agent will opportunistically seek his own advantage, and, if this is in his or her inter-
est, do so also by ruthlessly violating the interests of his or her exchange partner in the 
process. The opportunism and “bounded rationality” (Simon 1955) of actors lead to 
uncertainty, which would cause market failure. Institutions that restrict opportunistic 
behavior allow for economic exchange despite the Hobbesian action orientations. Mar-
ket institutions – which are explained based on their contribution to efficiency – permit 
the stabilization of market actors’ expectations by guarding against exploitation, thus 
helping to make markets possible. 
To generalize the findings of information economics and the new institutional econom-
ics: If we depart from the central premises of general equilibrium theory, the regulatory 
problems of markets silenced by the heroic assumptions of neoclassical theory return. 
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In order to resolve them, we need to include institutional regulatory mechanisms. At the 
same time, these economic approaches explain the emergence of institutional regula-
tions in terms of the interests of the participating actors, thereby retaining the individu-
alist basis of the explanation of the order of markets.
The new economic sociology
The new economic sociology, whose development over the past twenty years has made 
the study of markets an important subject of sociological research once again, also takes 
up the problematic of explaining the order of markets (Aspers 2005; Fligstein 2001a; 
Podolny 2005; Swedberg 2003; White 2001). In doing so, however, it does not share the 
individualist basis of economic theories. 
Classical sociological theory already addressed the social preconditions for stabilizing 
market relations, and rejected the economic solution of the problem of order based on 
the self-interest of market actors. Émile Durkheim’s (Durkheim 1984) concept of the 
non-contractual elements of contract makes it clear that the observance of contracts by 
market parties presupposed in neoclassical theory could not be explained solely in terms 
of the interests of the participating actors. Max Weber’s (Weber 1978, 1992) explanation 
of the development of the institutional foundations and individual action dispositions 
against the backdrop of which modern western capitalism arose is also not based on the 
self-interest of the participants, but rather on power-saturated political processes and 
religious transformations. To put it in more general terms: The introduction of asym-
metrical information and strategic action have far more serious consequences for the 
understanding of markets than economic approaches assume, because they fundamen-
tally challenge explanations of ordering processes that proceed from an individualistic 
vantage point using the rational actor model. 
Two reasons account for this: First, institutional entrepreneurs are acting in an already 
institutionally structured environment, making outcomes dependent on past occur-
rences (Djelic/Quack 2007: 163ff.; Streeck/Thelen 2005). Second, since actors are con-
fronted with uncertainty (Beckert 1996) they cannot, on the one hand, know in advance 
which strategies will lead to an optimal outcome, and on the other are inevitably con-
fronted with collective action dilemmas. Therefore it is impossible for them to devise 
and realize an optimal institutional design (Beckert 1996; Jagd 2007: 77ff.). The im-
ponderables that result from strategic uncertainty and the essential unpredictability of 
future events belie an understanding of market action that proceeds from atomized, 
utility-maximizing actors.1 Actors do not have the calculative bases for optimizing their 
1 In game theory, the idea of the “institution as the equilibrium outcome of a game” was intro-
duced to resolve this problem (Schotter 1981: 155). Institutions are understood here not as 
“rules of the game” as in the new institutional economics, but rather as a Nash equilibrium in a 
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utility-functions in the face of bounded rationality, social interdependence and new 
action situations (Beckert 2002: 7ff.). The resulting uncertainty leads them to resort to 
socially anchored scripts or “conventions” that serve as a “collectively recognized refer-
ence” (Orléan, quoted in Jagd 2007: 79), giving orientation to intentionally rational 
actors.2 These “substitutes” for optimizing in the sense of economic theory reduce un-
certainty based on culturally anchored understandings of situations, allowing actors to 
make sense of the complex circumstances of the decisions they face. Hence individual 
decision making must always be understood within its social contexts that lead to the 
“framing of markets” (Fiss/Kennedy 2007). That decision making in capitalist econo-
mies cannot be grasped in terms of optimal “single exit” situations is, moreover, – as I 
will argue in the last section of this article – a critical element of the dynamism of capi-
talism (Beckert 2002; Deutschmann 1999). 
In consequence sociological explanations of the emergence, stability and change of insti-
tutions and their effects on market interaction differ fundamentally from the economic 
approach: Institutions are understood not from a contractarian perspective as the effi-
cient result of an agreement of socially unbound individuals, but rather as situated with-
in a specific political, social and cultural context that constitutes the actors’ goals, strate-
gies and cognitive orientations. Institutions are historically and cognitively bound.
Market sociology focuses on the question of how social networks, social norms, cogni-
tive structures and formal institutions reduce the contingency inherent in the situation. 
In order for markets to be operational, these social macrostructures must lead to stable 
expectations with regard to the likely behavior of other relevant market participants, so 
market actors are confident enough to engage in market transactions despite the risks 
they must take. For market exchange to gain legitimacy, the expected outcomes must, 
moreover, be considered normatively acceptable distributional results. Only on this ba-
sis can stable role structures reproduce themselves in markets, and social order emerge. 
In the past twenty years, the concept of embeddedness has become established in eco-
nomic sociology as a categorical instrument for describing those ordering processes that 
lead to a reduction of the uncertainty of the action situation and the social structuring 
of decisions in market contexts (Granovetter 1985; DiMaggio/Powell 1991).3 The dif-
ferentiation of the concept of embeddedness – Zukin and DiMaggio (1990) distinguish 
between social, cultural, political and cognitive embeddedness – points to different ap-
repeated non-cooperative game. This solution, however, demands perfect rationality and thus 
has preconditions that neither the new institutional economics nor economic sociology antici-
pates. On this, see Richter (2000).
2 Furthermore, in non-cooperative games like the prisoner’s dilemma, the departure from the 
logic of individual utility maximizing can lead to more efficient outcomes, also rejecting ratio-
nal actor theory as a normative theory of utility maximization.
3 The use of the term in the new economic sociology, however, has little in common with its mean-
ing in the work of Karl Polanyi, to whom the concept is generally attributed (Beckert 2007a; 
Krippner 2001).
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proaches in market sociology. What these approaches share is the assumption of action-
structuring social macrostructures, which are reproduced and shaped by the actors, but 
cannot – in efficiency theoretical terms – be causally attributed to individual rational 
action. This can be seen in all three main approaches to the study of markets in the new 
economic sociology (Dobbin 2004a; Fligstein/Dauter 2007; Fourcade 2007):
(1) The network approach associated particularly with the works of Mark Granovetter 
(1985, 2002) and Harrison White (1981, 2001), emphasizes the social embeddedness of 
market actors. The approach explains economic outcomes based on the structure of 
social networks and the positions individual nodes hold within these structures. Ac-
cording to network analysts the structures of social relationships are more important 
for explaining the behavior of market actors than ethical attitudes or institutional ar-
rangements (Granovetter 1985: 490).
(2) By contrast, the institutional approach, which is associated with the work, for in-
stance, of Neil Fligstein (2001a), Frank Dobbin (1994), Bruce Carruthers (1994; Car-
ruthers/Halliday 1998) and Viviana Zelizer (1979, 1994, 2007), primarily stresses the 
institutional and cultural embeddedness of market exchange.4 The term “institution” is 
used in different ways, but proponents are largely orientated towards the new sociologi-
cal institutionalism, where a broad definition of institutions prevails (DiMaggio/Pow-
ell 1991; Scott 2003). By emphasizing the importance of formal institutions and state 
regulation in constituting and stabilizing markets, some authors associated with the 
institutional approach exhibit an affinity to comparative political economy, and its at-
tribution of different national strategies of firms to the specific institutional structures 
of national economies (Hall/Soskice 2001: 4ff.).5
(3) Finally, a third approach in the sociology of markets is centered on notions of cog-
nitive embeddedness. This approach is not fully separated from the institutional ap-
proach, at least not from sociological institutionalism. Institutional organization the-
ory (Meyer/Rowen 1977) explains organizational structures as responses to taken for 
granted scripts prevailing in the institutional environment of actors. The more recently 
developing performativity approach (Callon 1998; MacKenzie/Muniesa/Siu 2007) is 
4 The concept of cultural embeddedness has not produced an autonomous market sociological 
programme, but rather has acquired significance above all in various combinations with the 
network approach or the institutional approach (Bourdieu 1999, 2005; DiMaggio 1994; Zelizer 
1979). Political embeddedness, and with it discussions of the state regulation of markets, is as-
sociated with the institutional approach.
5 Comparative political economy focuses on the explanation of entrepreneurial strategies rather 
than the analysis of the preconditions for stable market relations. As a result, comparative po-
litical economy is far more interested in the production problems of enterprises. The observed 
coordination problems become concentrated in the question of how and under what condi-
tions enterprises gain access to the resources they need to manufacture products (Hall/Soskice 
2001: 4). Market sociology, in contrast, stresses the coordination problems that arise in the ex-
change of goods or services, drawing more attention to the exchange processes themselves and 
to the demand side.
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more distanced from institutionalism. It stresses the role of economic theories in the 
explanation of the structuration of markets (Garcia 2007) and of actor strategies in 
markets (MacKenzie/Millo 2003). This allows demonstrating that the way economic 
actors think about the functioning of markets actually shapes markets by aligning orga-
nizational structures, strategies and reciprocal expectations of market participants.
3 Value, competition and cooperation as central coordination problems
The explanation of economic outcomes in terms of social contexts is the common de-
nominator in the differing approaches to market sociology (see Dobbin 2004b). While 
innumerable empirical studies based on the three above-mentioned approaches dem-
onstrate the role played by social macrostructures in the explanation of economic out-
comes, when it comes to addressing theoretically the systematic problems to which the 
embeddedness of economic action is actually a response, they remain largely silent. In 
the new economic sociology, the emphasis on demonstrating the embeddedness of mar-
ket action through empirical investigation has meant that the previous issue – namely 
which general problems confronted by market actors that are of theoretical interest to the 
explanation of the order of markets can be addressed by focusing on the embeddedness 
of market behavior – has been virtually disregarded. Programmatic statements aimed 
at defining a future research agenda often either stress approaches (Dobbin 2004b) or 
identify appealing empirical research topics (Carruthers 2005: 346ff.; Zelizer 2007).
I contend that the coordination problems faced by market actors in the complex and 
uncertain situations in which they make decisions are at the heart of a sociological 
approach to markets. How is it possible to integrate interaction in a social arena popu-
lated by actors with highly diverse backgrounds and conflicting interests? The notion 
of the “order of markets” expresses in abstract terms the explanandum of the sociology 
of markets. The order of markets is grounded in social macrostructures that allow for 
relatively stable reciprocal expectations which actors have with regard to the behavior 
of relevant others and future events. Thus some occurrences are considered more likely 
than others, allowing for the reduction of the uncertainty of expected outcomes by cre-
ating a sense of normalcy and constituting a basis for means-ends calculations in mar-
ket interaction. Moreover, some outcomes are normatively acceptable to actors, while 
others are not, making the order of markets also dependent on the legitimacy of distri-
butional results. It is my contention that the problem of the integration of markets must 
be addressed on the basis of a theory of action, bringing two interrelated questions to 
the foreground. First: How do institutions, networks or cognitive structures contribute 
to the solution of the coordination problems faced by market actors by influencing their 
behavior? And second: How do these macrostructures become established, stabilize and 
change?  
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In this section I argue that one can distinguish between three fundamental coordination 
problems, which represent the central sources of uncertainty for market actors. I call 
these issues the value problem, the problem of competition and the cooperation prob-
lem. My claim is that these three topics provide a comprehensive tableau of the relevant 
coordination issues in markets and that an understanding of their resolution allows for 
the explanation of the order of markets. The sociology of markets must be able to dem-
onstrate its contribution to the understanding of these coordination problems relative to 
economic approaches that in many ways address the very same questions, and which in 
their most advanced expressions have undergone a “sociological turn” (Greif 2006: XV).
I will discuss the three topics in turn, addressing for each of them the questions of 
how social macrostructures contribute to the resolution of the problems at hand and 
how the emergence and change of these macrostructures can be explained in terms of 
sociological action theory. This framing of the sociology of markets also rejects the dis-
tinction between network approaches, institutional approaches, and cognitive advances 
since networks, institutions and cognition are seen as complementary in the resolution 
of the cited problems.6
The value problem
The value problem refers primarily to the constitution of actor preferences. One crucial 
source of uncertainty confronting market actors derives from the difficulties of assess-
ing the value of commodities. Given the multiplicity of goods and their complex quality 
properties, market actors have trouble “forming clear subjective values for goods in the 
market” (Koçak 2003: 8). Only when purchasers are in a position to distinguish between 
the values of goods, and sellers can reliably demonstrate the value of their goods, will 
uncertainty be reduced and a disposition to buy arise (Koçak 2003: 5–6). 
This is a central initial problem of market sociology, referring to the constitution of 
actors’ goals, which finds no place in neoclassical economic theory. The latter assumes 
preferences as given and stable, and thereby exogenizes their emergence and change. 
This led to Talcott Parsons’ critique (Parsons 1949) that economic theory was caught up 
in a “utilita rian dilemma.” What he meant was that economic theory either explained 
the action goals of agents on the basis of behaviorist determinism or had to leave them 
unexplained, viewing them as purely random: De gustibus non est disputandum. This 
did not mean that neoclassical theory was wrong, but that it contained a central limita-
tion, since it could not explain the arisal of preferences or the assignment of value to 
6 While there is a general unease with regard to the separation of these three approaches in eco-
nomic sociology (Fourcade 2007: 1026), few articles address this problem explicitly. One ex-
cellent exception to this is Djelic (2004), who shows the connections between networks and 
processes of institutionalization. See also Beckert (2007c).
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goods. Parsons’ solution consisted in the introduction of ultimate values on the basis 
of which actors determine their action goals, which points to the social – and not indi-
vidualist – constitution of preferences. How, though, are we to understand the processes 
of classification and commensuration with which actors assign value to goods?
(1) The value problem is concerned, on the one hand, with the assignment of differ-
ent values to heterogeneous products within the same market. The classification may 
be based on standards that make possible objective quality descriptions of products in 
relation to other products of the same class. Thus the determination by technical test 
procedures of the load-bearing capacity of steel springs from different alloys would be 
an example of a technically defined classification for the purposes of quality distinction, 
which can form the basis of value differentiations. Different steel springs of a specified 
quality offered by different producers in the market can then be compared based on 
price, and preferences can be formed. The basis for the classification is a technical stan-
dard. Yet even such classifications aimed solely at establishing the functional value of a 
product in relation to others are possible unambiguously only in the case of very simple 
products. Once products turn out to be more complex, the criteria for valuation them-
selves become contested and must be established in political and social processes that 
lead to their acceptance. The question of what criteria to apply in assessing the value of 
used cars also depends on conventions established in a technical field. The same holds 
true, for instance, in decisions concerning the selection of personnel. Although employ-
ers aim to hire the best or most suitable employees, the question of what criteria should 
be used to establish an employee’s qualification is subject to dispute among experts, 
changes over time and differs between countries (Segalla/Sauquet/Turati 2001). 
The social processes behind the constitution of value become fully visible if we turn to 
a market where objective standards of quality assessment play no role at all. The market 
for contemporary art is such a market where actors have no recourse to objective stan-
dards located in the product itself. In this market, assessments of value are established in 
interactive processes of recognition within the field of art itself (Beckert/Rössel 2004). 
It is the recognition an artist finds among reputable and influential members of the art 
world – such as art critics, museum curators, galleries and collectors – that establishes 
the quality of his or her work. Much the same is true of the wine market (Diaz-Bone 
2005; Rössel 2007). Although it is ultimately the individual buyer who decides what 
price he or she is willing to pay for a product, the assessment of value is not entirely 
of his or her own making, but rather relies on socially constructed judgements that 
reduce uncertainty and thereby stabilize expectations in a social field. “Confusion over 
the product’s identity” (Zuckerman 1999: 1398) itself affects the value of goods, as has 
been shown for financial markets (Zuckerman 1999). If classifications of firms in terms 
of belonging to a specific industry are unclear, it becomes more difficult for analysts and 
investors to assign meaning to the information they gather from this firm, which in turn 
increases uncertainty and leads to lower stock market prices. At the same time, the sta-
bility of identities is constantly being undermined (Callon/Méadel/Rabeharisoa 2002) 
because new products enter the field and some actors are always interested in changing 
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existing categorizations in order to increase their reputation or profits by creating at-
tachment to their products. This is most apparent in the field of fashion, and is a crucial 
background to the dynamism of modern capitalism.
(2) On the other hand, the value problem refers to the assignment of value to goods 
of a certain class, for example automobiles, works of modern art or wine. The value 
may result from the commodity’s functional contribution to solving a specific problem, 
such as getting from point A to point B, or satisfying one’s hunger. Contrary to the as-
sumptions of economic theory, however, there is no evidence that efficient solutions 
– i.e., economically determined “single exit” solutions – consistently win out, nor can 
we explain purchase decisions in functionally saturated consumer markets biologically 
or in terms of objective functional requirements. This opens the question of why actors 
value certain products and not others to sociological analysis. The primary sociological 
postulate is that the valuation of certain categories of goods is socially and culturally 
patterned. This can be a normative orientation, a cognitive point of reference or a pos-
sibility for social positioning that is “realized” by acquiring a particular good. 
The influence of normative assessments can be seen, for instance, in the effects of reli-
gious dietary restrictions on the evaluation of certain foods (for example pork among 
Muslims and Jews). But it can also be seen in financial markets. Viviana Zelizer’s (1979) 
work on the emergence of the life insurance industry in nineteenth-century America 
demonstrates the initial blockage of market demand for life insurance by religious (and 
superstitious) convictions. An example of the relevance of normative and cognitive as-
sessments for the valuation of products is also the market for whale watching. Its exis-
tence became possible only with profound changes in the symbolic meaning of whales 
in western culture (Lawrence/Phillips 2004). While for centuries whales were regarded 
as dangerous and thus threatening giants – e.g., in the epochal description by Herman 
Melville – today they symbolize the value of freedom and of intact nature, and are 
deemed particularly worthy of protection. Only on the basis of this shift of meaning 
did the value of “whale watching” as a product and thus the emergence of a market 
become possible. Assessments of specific characteristics of goods can form as “rational-
ized myths” (Meyer/Rowen 1977) within institutional fields. In more general terms, the 
normative and cognitive framing of markets, anchored in social belief systems, is a con-
stitutive element of their emergence because it shapes the assessment of the desirability 
and suitability of the products offered and thus reduces uncertainty in markets. 
The uncertainty of value attribution is additionally reduced when products facilitate 
status assignments. The value of goods arises from the social recognition stemming 
from their possession, which provides “status” to the owner (Aspers 2005). Examples 
for this are fashion markets but also luxury products. In order for status orders to work, 
goods must be imbued intersubjectively with corresponding meanings. A luxurious 
brand such as “Gucci” must be recognized by third parties in order to be effective in sig-
nalling social status. Thorstein Veblen presented this most impressively (Veblen 1973) 
in his description of “conspicuous consumption.” 
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The more the value of products becomes detached from the fulfillment of purely func-
tional needs, the more they depend upon symbolic assignments of value that must be 
constructed by market actors. Through the “attachment” (Callon/Méadel/Rabeharisoa 
2002) to goods, expectations are stabilized and uncertainty with regard to the value of 
a product reduced. To understand such attachments, market sociology needs a theory 
of preference formation, which could be based in socialization theory, learning theory 
or social movement theory. Talcott Parsons’ (Parsons 1949) theory of action establishes 
the role of the internalization of norms as an important aspect of preference forma-
tion. This remains, however, much too general and also too static for understanding the 
dynamic changes of preferences in markets. Pierre Bourdieu’s (Bourdieu 2005) notion 
of habitus, which can be understood as founded upon a socialization theory – Bour-
dieu (2005: 84) speaks of habitus as “socialized subjectivity” – provides an explanation 
for social stratification based on the valuation of goods (“taste”) which is, however, 
ultimately rooted in economic reasoning. Although the theory allows for an historical 
and social understanding of the emergence of preferences and tastes, the theory ap-
pears too simplistic in the mechanisms it describes for the emergence of attachments to 
specific products. Social movement theories enable us to explain the cycles in demand 
behavior, starting with a run on certain products and ending with their sudden demise 
(Deutschmann 1999: 130; Fligstein 2001a: 76f., 2001b). A theory explaining preferences 
for specific goods needs to take into account the paramount role of producers who 
attempt to create consumer attachment to their goods through their marketing invest-
ments. These activities account for an increasingly large proportion of production costs 
(Aspers 2005; Callon/Méadel/Rabeharisoa 2002) and are part of the market struggle 
between producers.
It is only through processes of standardization, cognitive anchoring, normative legiti-
mation and social positioning that the subjective value attributions arise with which 
market actors assign value to goods. It is not a question here of all actors assigning the 
same value to a good, but rather of individual actors being sufficiently convinced by 
their own valuations to want to acquire the corresponding commodities as buyers in the 
marketplace. For this they not only rely on institutionalized standards (Fligstein 2001a), 
network positions of producers (Podolny 2005) or social norms (Zelizer 1979), but they 
must also take into account a social dimension of their purchases that consists in their 
communication of social belonging through buying products loaded with intersubjec-
tively recognized meaning. The assignments of value are at the same time subject to a 
dynamic process of change, which is energized by technological or cultural innovations, 
advanced or impeded by the marketing activities of producers aiming at increased sales, 
and supported by consumer behavior aimed at social distinction. 
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The problem of competition
While the issue of valuation refers to the constitution of actor goals and is in this sense 
prior to market exchange proper, the two coordination problems that remain to be 
discussed address the general issue of how market actors can turn their preferences into 
preferred market outcomes. Now the exchange itself takes center-stage. The discussion 
focuses again on the role of social macrostructures and on the questions of how stable 
and profit-enabling macrostructures are established in markets and how they change.
The coordination problem to be discussed first is competition.7 One of the profound 
insights of neoclassical theory is the paradox that while efficient markets are based on 
perfect competition, in market equilibrium the marginal costs equal the marginal re-
turns and thus no profit can be made, which also extinguishes any incentive to produce 
for the market. Profit becomes possible only when markets find themselves in disequi-
librium (Chamberlin 1933; Knight 1985; Robinson 1933). This insight has profound 
consequences for the understanding of market processes: While competition is a con-
stitutive precondition for markets, it simultaneously threatens the profit expectations 
of market suppliers. Suppliers therefore have an interest in establishing market struc-
tures that shield them favorably from competitors, allowing them to reduce uncertainty 
with regard to their profit or wage expectations. At the same time, however, this affects 
the interests of competitors and demanders. Through the deviation from the ideal of 
perfect markets, market barriers are erected (Fligstein 2001a: 41) leading to prices that 
are higher than economically necessary. This conflict of interest constitutes the market 
struggle (Weber 1978: 72), which takes place between market competitors, the state and 
interest groups on the demand side over the containment, expansion, shaping and regu-
lation of competition (Lie 1997: 345). The behavior of market actors may be under-
stood in the terminology of “getting action” and “blocking action” (White 1992), which 
describes the intention to gain an advantage over competitors in network terms. By 
shaping the terms of competition, market actors create and change market structures 
that affect their market position and consequently their profit opportunities and distri-
butional shares. Hence the specific organization of competition is a contingent political 
and historical phenomenon, reflecting power structures within the market field. For a 
macrosociology of markets it is the investigation of this evolution of structures of com-
petition and the explanation of its direction which provides access to the understanding 
of capitalist development (Djelic 2006).
The dynamism of the conflict arises from the clash of interests between the participants. 
The market suppliers themselves seek to alleviate the uncertainty created by compe-
tition by product differentiation, first-mover advantages, reciprocal agreements, cor-
ruption, collusion, cartels or by achieving a monopoly position to stabilize their profit 
opportunities. This also shows the interconnectedness between valuation processes and 
7 I limit the discussion to competition between producers, leaving out competition on the de-
mand side.
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competition. The creation of consumer “attachment” to specific products leads to their 
“singularization” (Callon/Méadel/Rabeharisoa 2002: 202), creating de facto local mo-
nopolies through differentiation, which structures competition among producers. Har-
rison White’s (White 1981) market model portrays the structure of markets in terms of 
product differentiations that allow producers to position themselves in niches. In this 
model, it is the relative positioning of competitors (which is evident to all producers) 
within the market that reduces the uncertainty as to their own price-quantity decisions 
in the next production cycle and permits the emergence of stable reciprocal expecta-
tions regarding profitable strategies. 
The state is involved in the market struggle through its legislative role, for instance in 
competition law, labor law or intellectual property law as well as through the introduc-
tion of subsidies and duties and consumer protection measures (Trumbull 2006). While 
the role of the state is, on the one hand, to ensure competition despite the interest of 
powerful suppliers to reduce it, the state is also engaged in reducing competition among 
suppliers within its jurisdiction for instance through import tariffs and – in the case of 
labor markets – by restricting immigration and allowing for collective bargaining. The 
demand side of the market interface is primarily involved in these struggles through its 
interest in lower prices through the expansion of competition but also through honour-
ing differentiation strategies with its purchasing decisions.
The consideration of labor markets introduces a special aspect of the role of the reg-
ulation of competition. The institutional regulation of competition not only reduces 
uncertainty by creating stable expectations; it also determines the distribution of eco-
nomic wealth among market actors. As stated above, the order of markets depends not 
just on “stable worlds” (Fligstein 2001a), but also on socially acceptable outcomes. This 
refers not only to the level of wealth produced through markets in a society, i.e. the 
fulfillment of adaptive functions, but also and more particularly to the distribution of 
wealth among the members of society. Only if distributional outcomes are accepted will 
the organization of economic activities through markets gain the social legitimacy that 
is itself a precondition for the functioning of markets. The social and political power 
exercised in labor markets lead to significant levels of social inequality (Offe 2006), and 
extreme inequality may lead to the delegitimation of the market mechanism and result 
in social protest or social anomie and thereby even threaten the market system itself.8 
This makes clear that the operation of markets can only be understood within the larger 
context of society. 
This issue of distributional results is especially pertinent to labor markets. This has to 
do with the often recognized specifics of labor as a commodity: The commodity cannot 
be separated from its bearer, implying that market results directly affect the livelihood 
of the worker and his or her family (Polanyi 1957: 72ff.). Workers need to be shielded 
8 This refers to Durkheim’s notion of anomic suicide, which is connected in his work with his dis-
cussion of unfair prices, especially the price of labor (see Durkheim 1984: 162f.; Beckert 2001).
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from the imponderables of market competition in a qualitatively different way than 
other “commodities.” The encapsulation of competition in labor markets, which occurs 
through labor laws, and the cartelization of labor supply through collective bargaining 
and welfare state protection contribute to the order of markets by shifting the indi-
vidual market risks of workers to employers and society at large. The resulting par-
tial decommodification of labor is a precondition for ethically and socially acceptable 
distributional results. How exactly the risks are distributed between labor, capital and 
society is the result of continuous market struggles. The institutional embeddedness of 
labor markets shows how the concern with the operation of markets is inseparably in-
terwoven with the normative concerns of equitable distributional results and the social 
order at large – issues that have so far found little resonance in contemporary economic 
sociology. 
Every market supplier must either adapt the product offered to existing conditions of 
competition or influence these conditions in such a way as to create an environment 
in which the product can fill a profitable niche. This structuring of competition cre-
ates predictability for market actors but only contributes to capitalist growth if un-
certainty is not removed altogether through the strangulation of competition (Collins 
1990: 112). The economic position of suppliers must remain continually threatened by 
innovations or changes in regulations as well as by the competitive behavior of rivals 
and changes in consumer preferences. It is, however, the structures of competition with 
which “reproducible role structures” (White 1981) develop in markets that constitute 
the calculability of investments and contribute to the order of markets.
The market struggle described by Max Weber takes place only in parts through price 
competition between producers. It occurs mainly in the attempts of market actors to 
shape the macrosocial structure of exchange by regulating competition, collusion and 
creating differentiated products. In labor markets, the struggles are largely about shift-
ing market risks between employers, employees and the state. Hence markets are as 
much political arenas as they are economic realms. 
The problem of cooperation
While the process of structuring competition focuses on the supply side of the market, 
the third coordination problem concentrates on the interaction between the demand 
and supply sides. The problem of cooperation arises from the social risks that market 
actors incur because of their incomplete knowledge of the intentions of their exchange 
partners and the quality of the product they wish to purchase. Market relations are risky 
when one exchange partner makes an advance payment without being sure whether the 
other party will actually fulfill the contractual obligations, or when contracts are incom-
plete. These risks are greater the more difficult it is to recognize or specify the quality 
of a product and the less able the buyer is to infer the seller’s actual intentions from 
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his manifest signals. Only when buyers are confident of not being exploited by their 
contract partners will they engage in market exchange. Creating this confidence is thus 
a fundamental precondition of stable market relations (Barbalet 1998: 82ff.; Beckert 
2006; DiMaggio 2002). Conversely, markets implode as soon as this confidence disap-
pears, a phenomenon of which the panic reactions of depositors with banks (allegedly) 
threatened with insolvency are only one especially pronounced example. 
Solutions to the problem of cooperation have been discussed widely in the social scien-
ces over the last thirty years (Axelrod 1984; Bacharach/Gambetta 2001; Coleman 1990; 
Cook 2001; Gambetta 1988; Luhmann 1979). Institutional economics and game theory 
as well as the new economic sociology have investigated a variety of social mechanisms 
that contribute to raising ego’s estimation of the probability of cooperative action on 
the part of alter ego, and thus prevent market failure caused by the expectation of defec-
tion on the side of the exchange partner. The different approaches can be categorized 
largely along disciplinary lines. 
Economic advances explain cooperation on an individualistic basis. This can be seen, 
for instance, in game theoretical approaches, which understand cooperation in pris-
oner’s-dilemma games as a result of the expectation of repeated interactions (iterative 
games) or reputation effects that change the incentive structures of the players, mak-
ing cooperation (or conditional cooperation) the rational strategy. A second line of 
argumentation developed in economic approaches takes institutions into account that 
induce cooperative strategies through the effective sanctioning of defectors. These eco-
nomic approaches are limited: Game theory is unrealistic with regard to the knowledge 
actors require in the situation in order to act rationally. The new institutional econom-
ics remains individualistic as long as institutions are explained based on the efficiency 
gains they provide for actors (Greif 2006: 9). To the extent that institutions protecting 
cooperative relationships are seen as the result of efficient institutional design, the path-
dependency of institutional development is not taken into account.
Power-orientated approaches proceed from the enforcement of compliance based on 
the threat of force. Threats to secure cooperation figure especially prominently in ille gal 
markets in which the exchange partners cannot rely upon state-guaranteed legal pro-
tections (Besozzi 2001) and must ensure cooperation privately, while under pressure 
of possible state prosecution. In labor markets, the structural position of workers who 
must sell their labor power in order to secure their livelihoods represents a situa tion of 
structurally coerced cooperation (Offe 2006). While power undoubtedly can play an im-
portant role in securing cooperation, its scope is at the same time limited in ex plaining 
the integration of market exchange to the extent that market relations are voluntary.
Other sociological approaches to the problem of cooperation show how networks and 
institutions pattern the cooperation between actors. Network approaches view the will-
ingness of actors to accept the social risks of market exchange as a function of the struc-
ture of social networks. Mark Granovetter (1985: 490ff., 2005) points to the significance 
22 MPIfG Discussion Paper 07/ 15
of network structures for the development of trust between market parties. Someone 
who has already had positive experiences with an exchange partner in previous trans-
actions or at least knows a trustworthy person who has had interactions with him or 
her is more likely to accept the contract risk than an individual for whom the exchange 
partner is a complete stranger. Networks through which information travels more easily 
are better equipped to induce cooperative behavior, because their structures facilitate 
the sanctioning of defectors. Although the extent to which “social capital” can actually 
be built instrumentally is contested (e.g. Burt 1992), network approaches to coopera-
tion generally analyze social structure as the result of long historical processes (Putnam 
1993; Gambetta 1988). Institutionalist approaches in economic sociology regard the ex-
change partners’ normative or cognitive commitment to institutionalized rules as key to 
explaining cooperative action. Culturalist approaches draw on the orientation towards 
universal ethical norms or behavior rooted in tradition for their explanations. The in-
troduction of social norms in explaining cooperative behavior shows the limits of ratio-
nal actor theories, since norm compliance cannot be reduced to individual rationality. 
There is no guarantee that networks, social norms or tradition actually enhance co-
operation, and it is also evident that some cooperation in markets is disadvantageous 
to economic welfare. Highly fragmented network structures are detrimental to coop-
eration (Granovetter 1973: 1373f.), as are non-universalist ethical orientations, which 
prescribe cooperative behavior in exchange with members of the same ethnic group 
but not in exchange with outsiders (Portes/Sensenbrenner 1993). Moreover, collusion 
between “competitors” can be a source of inefficiency and economic exclusion. How-
ever, whether restraints on individual rationality are “beneficial” (Streeck 1997) is also 
a question of perspective: Beneficial for whom? Market actors benefit and suffer differ-
ently from existing constraints and might gain advantages from free-riding; they will 
therefore engage in struggles to either change, defend, or exploit existing cooperative 
structures and rules as part of the “market struggle.” 
While lasting market relations would be impossible without stabilized expectations re-
garding the cooperative intentions of exchange partners, the reduction of uncertainty 
through social macrostructures can never be complete. The possibility of defection is 
always present in the actors’ horizon of expectation, and is merely “suspended” (Möl-
lering 2006) by trust between cooperation partners.
4 The dynamics of markets
Studying markets from the perspective of the problem of social order initially leads to a 
foregrounding of static elements. It is a matter of creating stable expectations for actors 
by reducing the contingency entailed in the freedom of alter ego, which allows for the 
confidence of decision makers of being able to make investment and consumer deci-
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sions that will, by and large, not lead to disappointing outcomes. Such “stable worlds” 
(Fligstein 2001a) are a precondition for the expansion of markets. Historically, the 
emergence of modern, rational capitalism may be viewed as a process of developing in-
stitutional regulations, ethical action orientations and socio-structural linkages, which 
have made it possible to contain the coordination problems discussed here (Berghoff 
2004; Block/Evans 2005; Fligstein 2001a; Hellmann 2003; Weber 1992; Zucker 1986). 
In my discussion of the three coordination problems, I have indicated that the processes 
of creating stability of expectations nevertheless represent only one side in our under-
standing of market coordination. Value attributions change, profitable competitive po-
sitions are threatened by new products or altered regulations, and the danger of defec-
tion persists despite institutional safeguards, social norms and cooperation enhancing 
network structures. To be sure, “calculability” and “stable expectations” are precondi-
tions for market exchange. This does not, however, remove the essential element of un-
certainty from economic decision-making. Instead, the coexistence of “stable worlds” 
and uncertainty is an unavoidable state of affairs for capitalist economies. 
Empirically speaking, capitalist economies are characterized by the systematic expan-
sion and continual renewal of uncertainty (cf. Deutschmann 2007). This uncertainty 
can have its cause in exogenously caused crises (Fligstein 2001a: 32) but stems mostly 
from the innovative dynamism of capitalism itself and the sub stantive and geographi-
cal expansion of markets through changes in the competitive structure. In competi-
tive economies, innovations endanger the economic value of the products they seek to 
replace. The same holds true for new regulations or the deregulation of markets. The 
extension of the competitive mechanism as a result of political and social struggles in-
troduces uncertainty into fields of action heretofore subject to institutional constraints 
(Weber 1978: 635ff.; Polanyi 1957). The emergence of labor markets is the most impor-
tant example of this. To investigate the political and historical processes leading to the 
concrete forms of market regulation to be observed and their changes opens the analy-
sis of markets to the political macrodimensions of market development. 
Theoretically, the relationship between uncertainty and profits demonstrates the con-
stitutive significance of “zones of unpredictability” for the capitalist economy. Frank 
Knight (1985) has pointed out that under conditions where a probability calculation of 
risks is possible, what neoclassical theory showed for perfect markets applies: There are 
no profits. Only situations containing uncertainty open up a space for entrepreneurial 
action in the Schumpeterian sense, in which the chances of profit arise precisely from 
the incalculability of risks. Although market transactions are always institutionally and 
sociostructurally embedded, actors nevertheless necessarily face imponderables that 
provide the threats and opportunities upon which capitalist dynamism is based. 
The nexus of the necessary reduction of uncertainty through the embeddedness of 
market exchange and the simultaneous preservation of a “realm of unpredictability” as 
core elements of the order of markets can be used to build a model of the dynamic char-
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acter of capitalism centered on the notion of “dynamic disequilibrium.” By this term I 
allude to the continuous processual changes built into capitalist accumulation that are 
not moving in the direction of a static equilibrium but reflect permanent contestation 
in the economic field where actors with partly overlapping, partly opposing interests 
engage in “control efforts” (White 1992: 9ff.) to shape and use social macrostructures 
to enhance their goals. These control projects and their dynamic character have social 
preconditions that are partly systemic, partly institutional and partly rooted in the ca-
pabilities of human actors.
(1) The systemic preconditions for the unprecedented dynamism of modern capitalism 
can be described on two levels. First on the level of market competition where it is the 
“free-market pressures that force firms into a continuing process of innovation” (Bau-
mol 2002: viii). Second it can be seen in the detachment of the economic system from 
the satisfaction of concrete material needs and its orientation toward an, in principle, 
infinite referential context of “absolute wealth” (Deutschmann 1999) in which the logic 
of capital accumulation takes center stage. The infinite character of wealth has its basis 
in the purely quantitative nature of monetary wealth. But in order to be maintained and 
increased, monetary wealth must be invested as capital in qualitatively specific and at 
the same time not fully calculable ventures (Deutschmann 1999: 130ff.). These logics of 
capitalist accumulation forces capital owners constantly to seek new opportunities for 
investment, from which they expect to derive profits. 
(2) Institutionally, it is precisely the expansion of markets and with it the anchoring 
of competition as the basis of the organization of economic production and distribu-
tion that provides actors with an institutional environment that is comparatively open 
to change through deviant behavior. Competition forces suppliers constantly to seek 
out new opportunities in order to make profitable investments. The – ideal-typically 
viewed – curbing of traditional limitations and restrictions on the exercise of hierarchi-
cal power in markets constitutes an environment favorable to innovation (Beckert 1999: 
792f.). 
(3) On the actor level, the dynamic processes of continuous change are rooted, first, in 
the human ability to envision future states of the world and, based on these visions, to 
abandon routinized behavior (Beckert 2003: 775). In Joseph Schumpeter’s (Schumpe-
ter 1934, 1991), concept of “creative destruction,” this “creativity of action” (Joas 1996) 
became the starting point for a theory of the dynamism of capitalism.9 The second 
precondition to be mentioned on the level of actors is the historical formation of the 
motivation to engage in utility-maximizing behavior. While liberal economic theory 
9 Following Christoph Deutschmann (1999, 2007), the significance of this quality of action for 
the capitalist economy can be extended still further: Creativity is not merely typical of entrepre-
neurial action, but is the characteristic of free labor power as such. “Added value,” the argument 
goes, arises from exhausting the creative – and in their results always incalculable – potentials of 
manpower in the production process. 
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holds economic rationality to be a “natural propensity” (Smith 1976), it is evident that 
rational action orientations were at least expanded in the historical process of the emer-
gence of capitalism. This expansion was grounded in ethical transformations (Weber 
1992), but also took place through violent disciplining measures (Thompson 1968).10
These general considerations regarding change in the composition of markets can be 
related to the three coordination problems identified. Entrepreneurs are systematically 
trying to change consumers’ value attachments by attempting to convince them of the 
(superior) value of their products. Their success contributes at the same time to the 
devaluation of the products substituted, hence creating uncertainty in the market. This 
process is fueled not only by market suppliers, but also by consumers looking for new 
ways to express status differentiation and lifestyles and to create “self-illusionary experi-
ences” (Campbell 1987: 89) constructed from the meanings associated with products. 
At the same time entrepreneurs are seeking to remodel the structures of competition 
in ways that provide them with more favorable market positions. If they succeed, this 
results in regulatory changes or advantageous market structures for them that change 
the composition of markets and thereby create dynamism. Finally entrepreneurs are 
trying to induce others to cooperate with them by investing in activities that signal the 
trustworthiness of their products and by forming coalitions or social movements in 
markets which align others’ behavior with their own interests. 
In capitalist economies, the creativity of action comes up against the motivations of ac-
tors and institutional as well as systemic structures that lead to a continual challenging 
of existing processes, products and technologies by innovation. This perpetually renews 
the uncertainty for actors – paradoxically enough precisely in the attempt to master it. 
Deviant action produces both the chances of profit that provide the incentive to pro-
duce for the market and the destabilization that forces other actors to adapt, and that 
must be mitigated by the socio-structural, institutional and cultural embeddedness of 
markets. In this way the market struggle between competitors leads to states of disequi-
librium, which are constantly changing. New products, altered regulations, changed 
networks or new cultural perceptions of products or market opportunities transform 
the competitive situation in markets, creating dynamism. But to the same degree that 
uncertainty opens up a realm of possibilities, it also demands the stabilizing of expecta-
tions for which social macrostructures play a pivotal role. 
10 This becomes visible, for instance, in historical studies of the development of free labor markets 
that reveal that the possibility of higher earnings did not initially motivate tradition-bound 
workers to do more work, but rather to shorten their working day (Thompson 1968).
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5 Conclusion
If one views market action from the perspective of the three coordination problems, 
the focus is on the interaction between actors and their institutional, cultural and social 
embeddedness. These social macrostructures and their dynamic changes play a more 
fundamental role in the study of ordering processes in markets than the price mecha-
nism foregrounded in neoclassical theory (Hayek 1973: 115ff.). Although changes in 
prices emerge from changes in supply and demand, these changes themselves reflect 
changes in the social, institutional and cognitive structures of markets. Hence prices are 
not seen as the aggregate result of individual preferences but rather as the outcome of 
social macrostructures patterning economic action. 
The approach to market sociology suggested in this article seeks to develop a funda-
mental understanding of how coordination problems are solved in order to account for 
why, and under what conditions, markets become successful devices for the organiza-
tion of economic activities. The concern is, on the one hand, with the constitution of 
actor preferences, which are explained based on normative, cultural and social structur-
al influences stemming from the social context in which market actors live. On the other 
hand, market sociology aims to understand how market actors realize their preferences 
in the exchange process. In this they are confronted with two coordination problems – 
competition and cooperation – which must be resolved if stable exchange relationships 
are to evolve. Again, the assumption underlying the sociology of markets is that these 
problems are resolved based on the regulative influence of social macrostructures – in-
stitutions, social networks and cognitive structures.
The challenge for market sociology is not just to show a correlation between these 
structural forces and market outcomes, but rather to explain in detail how the macro-
structures emerge, stabilize, and change in processes of social interaction and how they 
actually influence behavior in market contexts. Contrary to economic institutionalism, 
it is not assumed that social macrostructures can be explained out of the efficiency 
concern of market actors. Not just the complexities of decisions, but also collective 
action dilemmas and the historicity of institutions and networks, speak against this 
possibility. Instead, social macrostructures are viewed as manifestations of contingent 
social processes whose evolution can only be analyzed in historical terms. This is not to 
deny that market actors are involved in instrumental control efforts through which they 
try to change the regulative structures they are subjected to in the attempt to enhance 
their market position. However, the outcome of these struggles cannot be explained in 
efficiency terms since the underlying processes are far too complex to be open to the 
instrumental control of actors. Instead the development of the macrostructures prevail-
ing in markets needs to be understood as a political, social and cultural process which 
can be explained only by following the historical development of the evolution of spe-
cific markets.
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Just as the emergence and change of institutions, networks and cognition are important 
fields for market sociology, so is the influence of these structures on the interaction 
processes of market exchange. What we need are theories that explain how institutions, 
networks and cognitive structures actually influence behavior. How do the preferences 
of actors interact with the social macrostructures that form the conditions for action in 
the exchange process? We have little systematic knowledge of how social macrostruc-
tures translate into preferences and the behavior of actors. In order to lend weight to 
the claim that individual preferences are rooted in political, cultural and social macro-
structures, we need a theory that clarifies how the transformation from the macrolevel 
to the actor level actually occurs. It is not enough to look at social macrostructures as 
constraints on action, and explain outcomes as rational or culturally infused responses 
to these constraints. Rationalist interpretations are unsatisfactory because they cannot 
account for the effectiveness of norms in social interaction. Cultural and morphological 
determinism remain unsatisfactory because they fail to take into account the contin-
gency of interpretations of social macrostructures by agents (Jagd 2007: 78). Although 
the meaning that a social situation attains for actors, as well as their reactions, are influ-
enced by cultural templates, institutions or network positions, they are not determined 
by them. These issues can be explored by studying diverse markets empirically and his-
torically with an eye to the coordination problems mentioned here. The broadest objec-
tive of this undertaking is to develop a “sociological theory of economic action” (Weber 
1978, Vol. 1: 68). 
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